From RAND
With the United States mired in a seemingly intractable battle that has become one of its longest overseas incursions ever, policy-makers may wish to take heed of new research from Santa Monica that examines what works and doesn't in counterinsurgency operations. Experts scrutinized more than 20 distinct approaches tested in various global hot spots over three recent decades, including in Turkey, Croatia, Somalia, Burundi, Tajikistan and Kosovo. Some key take-aways: Trying just one approach won't get it -- indeed, successful counterinsurgency operations employed multiple options; escalating repression, relocation of populations and increasing support of insurgents 'have the weight of evidence against them' and their prospects for success. Outsiders -- like the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq -- must gauge carefully their prospects for prevailing in a conflict by understanding deeply and carefully, the researchers say, both the popular support that local insurgents enjoy, and, more important, the tangible support (food, supplies, intelligence, cover) that they receive. A bad, undependable or shaky on-scene partner or government in a counterinsurgency? That's a grim indicator for counterinsurgency failure, something that might give U.S. policy-makers much greater pause, both in the past Bush administration and on to the Obama folks, about President Hamid Karzai and his regime in Afghanistan.
Successful campaigns found to tap multiple approaches, awareness of insurgents' support
Click here to get full RAND study, 'Victory Has a Thousand Fathers'
